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ABSTRACT 
 
Health screening promises to reduce risks to individuals via probabilistic sifting of 
populations for medical conditions. The categorisation and selection of ‘conditions’ 
such as cardiovascular events, dementia and depression for screening itself requires 
prior interpretive labour which usually remains unexamined. Screening systems can 
take diverse organisational forms and varying relationships to health status, as when 
purported disease precursors, for example ‘pre-cancerous’ polyps, or supposed risk 
factors such as high cholesterol themselves become targets for screening. 
Screening at best yields small, although not necessarily unworthwhile, net population 
health gains. It also creates new risks, leaving some individuals worse-off than if they 
had been left alone. The difficulties associated with attempting to measure small net 
gains through randomised controlled trials are sometimes underestimated. Despite 
endemic doubts, bibliometric analysis of published papers shows that responses to 
health risks are coming to be increasingly thought about in terms of screening. This 
shift is superimposed on a strengthening tendency to view health through the lens of 
risk. It merits further scrutiny as a societal phenomenon. 
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Health screening may be defined as an organised activity designed to reduce 
mortality and morbidity in populations by targeting those at higher risk of selected 
conditions. Screening provides a quintessential exemplar of late modern risk-
thinking, claiming to proactively reduce the prevalence of future diseases by means 
of probabilistic scanning in populations. This form of attempted prevention addresses 
future or presently unknown ‘conditions’, a term which raises often unexamined prior 
classificatory issues. Probabilistic risk assessment requires variations within a 
disease category and similarities between cases and non-cases to be ignored ,so 
that the chance of a ‘condition’ occurring can be enumerated. Once a category has 
been embedded into a screening system, the homogeneity and distinctiveness of the 
phenomena to which it refers tend to become taken for granted, their diversity lost 
sight of in the rush to quantify probabilities. Thus, McCormack, Levine and Rangno 
(1997) defined ‘cardiovascular events’ to include ‘angina, unstable angina, 
myocardial infarction or death from coronary artery disease’ as a precursor to 
discussing their probability assessment for screening purposes. The distinction 
between depression and sadness remains contentious (Robertson, 2008), but 
depression cannot be screened for unless the two states are differentiated. Similarly, 
the difficulties arising from defining a diverse range of phenomena as dementia are 
discussed by Milne (2010) in the present special issue. Screening systems address 
a selected, pre-packaged sub-set from the indefinite number of ways in which health 
can go wrong, numerically underestimated by Shakespeare’s Hamlet as the 
'thousand natural shocks that flesh is heir to' (Hamlet, Act III, Scene i). Their 
rationality relies on inductive reasoning. Multivariate statistical analysis is used to 
predict the probability of a particular categorised outcome occurring. There is no limit 
in principle to the range of ‘conditions’ which might be chosen as screening targets 
because a set of variables offering at least moderately accurate prediction in 
combination can always be found.   
 
Screening can take a variety of organisational forms, and relate to health problems in 
different ways. The private sector sells predictively dubious genome screening which 
claims to profile customers’ chances of experiencing a range of serious diseases in 
the future. Opportunistic screening, e.g. for cardiovascular disease, may be offered 
haphazardly to eligible patients who turn up at the GP surgery for other reasons. 
Formal screening of entire populations may be delivered nationally in compliance 
with tightly defined  specifications, as with the colorectal cancer screening 
programme recently rolled out in the UK for people aged 60-69. (Nationally 
standardised screening can be organised most easily in societies which have 
developed ‘socialised’ healthcare provision.) The preventative goals of screening can 
be attempted in various ways which need to be carefully distinguished: enabling 
earlier, possibly more effective, interventions to be initiated for patients who already 
have an undiagnosed condition; treating putative disease precursors like colon 
polyps and abnormal cervix cells; reducing purported risk factors such as high levels 
of low density lipid ‘bad’ cholesterol; providing options for weeding out fetuses with 
serious, incurable conditions; and buying time for adaption to unstoppable disease 
trajectories such as those of dementia and Huntingdon’s disease, discussed in this 
issue (Leontini, 2010; Milne 2010). The utility of second remove forms of prevention 
tends to be contested. For example, the value of removing ‘pre-cancerous’ colon 
polyps has not been firmly demonstrated, or even their definition agreed (Raffle and 
Gray, 2009, p. 64).  Hann and Peckham (2010) argue in this special issue that 
although ‘bad’ cholesterol has become a risk object in its own right, its relationship to 
future health remains debatable.  
 
The question of who benefits from screening also merits careful analysis. 
Preventative endeavours are usually oriented towards net health gains for the 
screened population. Nevertheless, some healthy individuals will end up harmed by 
screening itself, for instance when colonoscopy inflicts a potentially fatal bowel 
perforation, or amniocentesis causes a spontaneous abortion. Some types of 
screening, which might be more accurately labelled surveillance, are concerned at 
least as much with the safety of others as with that of the screened population: for 
example, with respect to TB and HIV screening at national borders; in child 
protection work, considered by Parton (2010) in this special issue; and in relation to 
the risk of mental health service users becoming violent, reviewed by Joan Langan 
(2010) in the next edition of Health, Risk & Society. The question of who is being 
protected becomes particularly contentious when pregnancy termination is the main 
preventative response. In such cases, ‘benefits’ may be considered with respect to 
the parents, the fetus/baby and/or taxpayers. Screening creates a new role, that of 
possessing higher risk status (Heyman et al., 2006) which incumbents may be 
enjoined to manage responsibly, i.e. in socially prescribed ways. Gross (2010) 
explores this issue in the present publication with respect to the meaning of giving 
birth to a child with Down’s syndrome after screening at higher risk. 
 
Despite variations in purpose, organisation and the directions of anticipated benefits, 
screening systems often, but not always, process individuals through four stages. 
Firstly, a population of screening candidates who might be affected by a delineated 
condition are marked out for preventative attention. More accurately, to become 
screening candidates, individuals must be assigned to a population considered to 
face a probability of developing the condition in question which is high enough to 
merit preventative attention, itself a complex and problematic matter of judgement. In 
the absence of additional information, each screening candidate is deemed to ‘carry’ 
a probability of the condition in question equal to its overall rate in the population to 
which she or he has been assigned. Secondly, screening candidates will be invited 
to undergo biomedical tests which, often combined with other predictive indicators 
such as age, lifestyle or family history as appropriate, allow these ‘prior’ probabilities 
to be adjusted up or down in individual cases. Thirdly, those whose post-screening 
probability exceeds a pre-defined level will be offered more accurate but also more 
invasive diagnostic tests. Finally, medical interventions will be offered to the 
proportionately tiny sub-sub-population who turn out to definitely carry the actual 
condition in question. 
  
This four stage risk assessment architecture is not inherent to screening, but is 
merely necessitated by technological limitations. For example, if the much promised 
but presently undelivered diagnostically accurate maternal blood test for fetal 
chromosomal anomalies (Chiu, Cantor and Lo, 2009) ever materialises, pregnant 
women could be screened diagnostically for chromosomal anomalies in a safe single 
step. Unfortunately, there appears to be a general truth that predictive accuracy has 
to be traded against economic and iatrogenic costs. Screening systems designed to 
accommodate this variant of Sod’s Law generate three states of risk knowledge: 
prior to screening, post-screening and post-diagnosis. Assessing the predictive 
accuracy and risk-reducing value of such systems requires clear understanding of a 
plethora of statistical concepts such as sensitivity, selectivity and positive/negative 
predictive value. Screening candidates who do not grasp these arcane matters 
cannot make informed choices about their navigation of screening mazes. They may 
not appreciate how small the risk-reducing benefits of participation can be. For 
example, one systematic review of mammography screening (Gøtzsche and Nielsen, 
2006) concluded that, over a 10 year period, one woman out of every 2000 invited 
for screening will have her life prolonged, 10 will endure unnecessary treatment and 
new risks, whilst 200 will have to cope with the psychological effect of a ‘false 
positive’, i.e. exceeding the probability threshold for further investigation. Because 
screening systems, including follow-up invasive diagnostic tests and medical 
interventions, invariably bring about numerous, qualitatively different consequences 
which vary in their chance of occurrence, assessing their net health gains requires 
complex summative judgements. The claim of health economics to be able to 
robustly perform this multi-attribute evaluative task requires more critical scrutiny 
than it sometimes receives (Carr-Hill, 1989; Peterson, 2007).  
 
Even at a descriptive level, the rationality of service level decision-making about 
screening provision is undermined by the limitations of randomised controlled trials 
(RCTs). Unfortunately, conclusive RCTs are both indispensible and difficult or 
impossible to deliver, a predicament which the more ardent proponents of evidence-
based healthcare sometimes fail to acknowledge. On the one hand, the 
costs/benefits of screening can only be soundly evaluated through RCTs of actual 
system performance. Neither uncontrolled comparisons of future disease rates 
among the screened and unscreened, or of population incidence before/after a 
screening system has been introduced, can demonstrate its utility for a host of 
reasons. In particular, screening brings forward the average time point of diagnosis 
in the disease trajectory, creating ‘lead time bias’, and identifies ‘pseudo-disease’ 
which would not otherwise have been noticed during the lifespan. Screening would 
appear to reduce the risks arising from a condition for these reasons even if it 
yielded no real health gains whatsoever. Furthermore, disease-specific comparisons 
cannot identify new risks created by screening and the medical interventions which it 
motivates. RCTs of overall mortality/morbidity address such issues. This evaluative 
methodology ensures, within the limits of sampling error, that those who were and 
were not offered screening did not differ on average before the intervention took 
place. (For randomness to be sustained, study participant allocation to the screening 
and control groups must be carried forward into the analysis regardless of whether 
individuals actually received screening or not.) On the other hand, the inherent and 
practical limitations of RCTs in this, and many other, contexts tend to be under-
recognised, perhaps because their acknowledgement challenges the claims of 
evidence-based healthcare. At least three of these limitations are inescapable. 
Firstly, screening trials cannot be double-blinded. Secondly, the robustness of their 
conclusions is undermined by the potential for differential losses of information about 
the intervention and control groups. And, thirdly, generalisation of findings requires a 
conceptual leap from particular design specifications and organisationally embedded 
manifestations of screening to conclusions about their generic utility.  
 
Even if these unavoidable methodological flaws are not considered fatal in relation to 
the detection of statistically tiny health gains, modernist claims about screening 
rationality have to confront a practical brick wall. The sheer expense and time 
demands of conducting interpretable prospective trials which are large enough to 
detect small effects over the required multi-decade timespan severely limit the scale 
of their implementation. This constraint make it inevitable that the explosive growth 
of screening, documented below, and capacity to evaluate its effectiveness through 
RCTs will continually run away from each other. Inescapable knowledge gaps 
abound, and should be regarded as generally endemic even if particular lacunae can 
eventually be filled. For example, the net clinical value of prostate cancer screening 
has not yet been established (Dragan et al., 2007). Similarly, (see Hann and 
Peckham (2010) in this special edition), the relationships between high levels of ‘bad’ 
low density lipoprotein cholesterol, statin use, coronary heart disease, and overall 
mortality/morbidity remain unclear (Hayward, Hofer and Vijan, 2006). Healthcare 
providers have to confront rationing of the at best flawed informational resources 
which they need in order to arrive at rational decisions about which screening 
services to provide. 
 
Despite these constraints, the influence of the esoteric architecture of screening is 
now growing rapidly, as Castel (1991) predicted nearly two decades ago. 
Comparisons across time of academic references provides one indication of such 
shifts (Skolbekken, 1995). The ‘Googlescope’, i.e. word searches through Google 
Scholar within the health-related literature, shows up a remarkably well-ordered 
increase in the proportion of  papers mentioning ‘risk’ over five year periods  from the 
1950s to the present day (Heyman et al., 2009, p. 4). Estimation of the proportions of 
papers discussing ‘risk’ which also refer to ‘screening’ allows the relevance of 
screening within risk thinking to be quantified in a rough and ready fashion. No clear 
trend appears until the present century. However, over the last decade, an 
accelerating tendency for papers which mention health ‘risk’ to also refer to 
‘screening’, illustrated in Figure One below, can be observed. 
 
Figure One
Proportions of medical papers mentioning 'risk'
which also refer to 'screening' 2000-2009
(Totals at bar tops, and 95% confidence intervals in brackets)
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2009 data incomplete - collected 5/11/09. 
 
Researchers appear to have been tugged by a steadily strengthening force over the 
last four decades which has impelled them to view health increasingly through the 
lens of risk. More recently, over the last decade, a further pressure has pushed 
scholars who are thinking about health risks to also consider screening. It is not 
unreasonable to speculate that this trend reflects not merely academic fashion, but 
also wider societal change in the organisation of responses to selected risks. The 
social sciences have contributed directly to this body of work, mostly through studies 
concerned with the meanings to participants of their encounters with particular 
screening systems. However, questions about the wider social significance of the 
shift towards screening can easily be lost sight of on account of its scale and 
diversity.  
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